The 'Iraq Surge Implementation' refers to the strategic deployment and execution of the 2007 U.S. troop surge in Iraq, a key counterinsurgency policy authorized by President George W. Bush and implemented under General David Petraeus. The surge involved sending an additional 20,000 to 30,000 U.S. troops to key areas like Baghdad and Anbar Province beginning in early 2007, peaking by mid-year, and implementing a 'clear, hold, and build' approach in coordination with Iraqi forces. This effort is widely credited with contributing to a significant reduction in sectarian violence, civilian casualties, and insurgent attacks by late 2007, with U.S. military assessments reporting a 60-80% drop in violence metrics by 2008, facilitating temporary stabilization that allowed for political reconciliation and eventual drawdown of forces. The implementation was part of a broader shift in U.S. military doctrine drawing from the Army-Marine Corps Field Manual 3-24 on counterinsurgency, involving not just troop increases but also diplomatic pressures on Iraqi leaders and economic aid programs. However, the surge faced substantial criticism for prolonging U.S. involvement in the war, escalating financial costs estimated at over $100 billion, and failing to address underlying political divisions in Iraq, with detractors arguing it masked deeper strategic failures. Long-term effects remain debated, with some analysts attributing success more to the Sunni Awakening and cessation of Iranian support than the surge itself. Controversies include allegations of overly optimistic reporting by military officials, high troop stress leading to increased PTSD rates, and ethical concerns over civilian impacts during operations. The policy's legacy influenced subsequent U.S. strategies in Afghanistan and continues to be studied in military academies and policy circles.