CIA Director George Tenet had a deeply antagonistic relationship with Chalabi. The CIA cut off direct INC funding in 1996 after concluding Chalabi was unreliable. In his memoir, Tenet described CIA analysts' fascination with Chalabi's claims as a 'schoolgirl crush.' Tenet was particularly incensed that INC intelligence bypassed CIA analysis through the Pentagon's OSP, fighting bureaucratic battles with Wolfowitz and Feith over Chalabi's credibility. The CIA vs. Pentagon war over Chalabi became one of the defining interagency conflicts of the Iraq War era.

Paul Wolfowitz was consistently critical of the CIA under George Tenet's leadership, viewing the agency as insufficiently aggressive in its assessments of Iraqi WMD programs and links to al-Qaeda. He was 'impatient with the C.I.A.' and believed it was underestimating the threats posed by Iraq. Wolfowitz and the Pentagon neoconservatives distrusted CIA analysis that found no credible link between Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda. Wolfowitz's creation of the Office of Special Plans was a direct attempt to circumvent the CIA's intelligence analysis, and he supported its work along with the Iraqi National Congress intelligence (via Ahmed Chalabi) that the CIA considered unreliable. The tension between Wolfowitz's Pentagon and Tenet's CIA represented a fundamental institutional conflict over intelligence and its use in policy-making.

Dick Cheney made unprecedented visits to CIA headquarters at Langley to pressure analysts on Iraq intelligence, a practice that career intelligence officers said created an atmosphere of intimidation. Cheney's office pushed CIA Director George Tenet and the agency to find links between Iraq and al-Qaeda and to confirm the existence of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). Tenet, who provided intelligence briefings to Cheney, later wrote that the vice president's public assertions on these matters "went well beyond" CIA assessments. Cheney and Tenet jointly briefed congressional leaders on Iraq in September 2002. Separately, Tenet, on behalf of the White House, asked NSA Director Michael Hayden whether the NSA could do more against terrorism, leading to the Stellar Wind warrantless surveillance program. Due to mutual distrust of the CIA, Cheney and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld also established an alternative intelligence program.

George Tenet married A. Stephanie Glakas-Tenet, a fellow Greek-American. She is an author who co-wrote the 'Dare to Repair' book series. As wife of the DCI during 9/11 and the Iraq War, she experienced the personal toll of his role, including security concerns and the controversy surrounding his tenure.

George Tenet served as Director of Central Intelligence during Rice's tenure as National Security Advisor. They were both members of the Principals Committee that authorized enhanced interrogation techniques including waterboarding. On July 17, 2002, Rice gave verbal approval for the CIA to proceed with 'alternative interrogation methods' on suspected al-Qaeda member Abu Zubaydah — a decision Rice later characterized as conveying 'the authorization of the administration,' not her personal authorization. Tenet was also the intelligence chief who delivered the famous 'slam dunk' assessment of Iraq WMD intelligence that Rice and other officials used to build the case for war. Their relationship was at the center of both the interrogation and WMD intelligence controversies.

John Michael Tenet is the only son of George and Stephanie Glakas-Tenet. Tenet cited his family's well-being as the primary reason for his resignation as DCI in June 2004, stating his departure had 'only one basis -- in fact, the well-being of my wonderful family.'